Author: Hannah Arendt
Year: 1992 (1963)
Publisher: Daidalos
Language: Swedish (Translator Barbro & Ingemar Lundberg)
Hannah
Arendt’s “Den banala ondskan” (“Eichmann in Jerusalem”) remains one of the most
provocative and intellectually rigorous studies of totalitarianism, moral
responsibility, and the nature of evil in the twentieth century. Emerging from
Arendt’s coverage of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial in Jerusalem for The New Yorker,
the book offers both a historical account of the Nazi bureaucrat’s role in the
Holocaust and a profound philosophical meditation on the mechanisms of mass
murder. With her penetrating analysis and sharp prose, Arendt delivers a work
that continues to spark debate among scholars, ethicists, and political
theorists to this day.
At the
heart of the book lies Arendt’s groundbreaking thesis of the “banality of
evil.” Rather than portraying Eichmann as a monstrous figure driven by
ideological fanaticism or sadistic cruelty, she presents him as a disturbingly
ordinary bureaucrat, a man whose mindless adherence to duty and legalistic
rationalisation enabled his participation in genocidal policies. In Arendt’s
view, Eichmann’s moral blindness and lack of critical self-examination, rather
than inherent malice, made him a key functionary in the Nazi machinery of
death. At the heart of the book lies Arendt’s groundbreaking thesis of the
“banality of evil.” Rather than portraying Eichmann as a monstrous figure
driven by ideological fanaticism or sadistic cruelty, she presents him as a
disturbingly ordinary bureaucrat, a man whose mindless adherence to duty and
legalistic rationalisation enabled his participation in genocidal policies.
Arendt’s
work is methodically structured, meticulously researched, and philosophically
astute. She provides a comprehensive account of Eichmann’s career, from his
early days as a functionary in the SS to his central role in organising the
logistics of deportation and extermination. At the same time, she does not shy
away from critiquing the legal and political dimensions of the trial itself,
particularly the use of the Israeli court to serve a broader national and
symbolic function. While she acknowledges the necessity of justice, she raises
concerns about the legal framework under which Eichmann was prosecuted,
particularly the retrospective application of laws and the potential for
political instrumentalisation.
Despite its
intellectual brilliance, “Den banala ondskan” was met with intense controversy,
particularly regarding Arendt’s perceived tone and her discussion of Jewish
leadership’s role in the Holocaust.
A more
confined but no less interesting area of critique, however, was her engagement
with Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. Arendt accuses Eichmann of
distorting Kant’s idea, arguing that he misapplied the principle in his defence.
A more rigorous reading of Kant, however, complicates Arendt’s conclusion,
raising the unsettling possibility that Eichmann’s actions were, at least
formally, consistent with Kantian ethics.
Arendt
asserts that Eichmann invoked Kant’s categorical imperative in bad faith,
failing to grasp its fundamental emphasis on moral autonomy. Eichmann claimed
that he acted according to duty, submitting to laws that he did not himself
create, and he saw his role as implementing the decrees of the Führer rather
than exercising independent moral judgment. Arendt dismisses this defence,
arguing that Kant’s philosophy demands self-legislation in accordance with
universal moral law, rather than blind obedience to external commands. However,
this interpretation raises a significant dilemma: Kant’s moral philosophy is
famously rigid in its emphasis on duty, and under certain conditions, it may
indeed produce the kind of mechanical compliance that Arendt condemns.
In short,
Eichmann’s compliance with the categorical imperative was not a matter of
genocide, which would hardly be possible to reconcile with Kant’s ideas, but
rather of duty and following the law. No single individual can will their own
law, but they can will whether to abide by it or not. Willing that the law is
universally obeyed seems quite compatible with the categorical imperative.
Many
notable thinkers have over the years supported Arendt’s conclusions that a
reading of Kant that provides for such heinous acts as the Holocaust is a gross
distortion. Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Rasmus Ugilt even go as far as calling
it “absurd”. Slavoj Zizek sees it as a circular argument to say that ‘your duty
is to do your duty.” Others, like Joshua Halberstam, are less dismissive. For
if the act of abiding by the law cannot be elevated to universal law, there seems
to be an inherent flaw in our understanding of what law means.
Be it as it
will, Arendt’s insights into the bureaucratic nature of modern evil remain
profoundly relevant in contemporary discussions of state violence, obedience to
authority, and moral responsibility. Her reflections on the dangers of
unthinking conformity resonate beyond the historical context of the Holocaust,
offering a crucial framework for analysing crimes against humanity in later
periods. Including our own era.
